Black markets for foreign exchange, real exchange rates, and inflation : overnight versus gradual reform in sub-Saharan Africa by Pinto, Brian
Policy,  Planning,  and  Resarch
WVORKING  PAPERP
Fnanaldi  Operations
The  Wor!d  Bank
September  1988
WPS  84
Black  Markets  for Foreign
Exchange,  Real  Exchange
Rates,  and Inflation
Overnight  versus
Gradual  Reform
in Sub-Saharan  Africa
Brian Pinto
Inflation could rise pernanently and substantially as a result of
unifying official and black market exchange rates, even if real
govwrment spending remains constant.
Tle  Policy. Planning, and Research Cmnplex distributes PPR Working Papers to dissaeinate  the findings of work in progress and to
enowuge  the exchange of ideas among  Bank staff and  all others imtesated in devclopmenx  issues Tbese  papers carry  the names of
the authon, reflect only their views, and hould be used and  cited accordingly.  The findings, interprettions,  and  umclusions are  the
















































































































dPolkamPbn*, and  Rueswh
Finandal Opaon
The olack market foreign exchange premium is  The steady-state and dynamic implications
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model that includes the portfolio balance ap-  the conditions under which undershooting or
proach to exchange rates, dual exchange mar-  overshooting occur are parametevized. The
kets, and seignorage for fnancing  the fiscal  paper is motivated by and illustrated with recent
deficit.  examples from Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figures 1  - 6I.  EXCHANGE  RATE  UNIFICATION  AND INFLATION
This  paper,  which  focuses  on exchange  rate  reform  and inflation  in
the  presence  of black  markets  for  foreign  exchange,  is  motivated  by the  recent
experience  of  certain  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  although  many  Latin
American  countries  would  qualify. Attempts  to  unify  official  and  black  market
exchange  rates  by officially  floating  the  domestic  currency  has in  two  recent
instances,  Sierra  Leone  and  Zambia,  led  to large  increases  in inflation,  with
an acceleration  in  the  rate  of currency  depreciation  relative  to that
historically  observed  in  the  black  market. Such  increases  in inflation  have
damaged  the  credibility  of the  economic  reform  and  weakened  official
commitment  to it.
What causes  these  surges  in  inflation? Take  Sierra  Leone. Sierra
Leone  experimented  briefly  with  a foreign  exchange  auction  in 1982,  abandoning
it in favor  of a fixed  peg  to the  dollar  till  it  floated  its  currency,  the
leone,  in July,  1986. The  black  market  exchange  rate (leone  per dcllar)  was
roughly  four  times  the  official  rate  prior  to floating. Inflation,  which  had
averaged  70  percent  per  year  ovez  the  previous  three  years,  jumped  almost
immediately  to an annual  rate  in  excess  of 200  percent,  at  which  it
stabilized.
Likewise,  Zambia  started  a foreign  exchange  auction  in  October,  1985,
after  unsuccessfully  trying  to lower  the  black  market  premium  and  improve
external  balance  through  managed  exchange  rate  rules  from  July,  1983. Its
curcency  had  been  linked  to  a foreign  currency  basket  and  was  depreciated
every  month  at a predetermined  rate  with  the  rationing  of commercial  and
capital  transactions  retained. The  black  market  premium  was in  excess  of  one
hundred  percent  when the  auction  started. Annual  inflation  rose  from  about  20
percent  in 1983  and  1984  to 37  percent  in 1985  (auction  started  in  October),
attaining  an estimated  level  of 70  percent  in  1986.-2
Two  basic  motives  have spurred  the  adoption  of  market  exchange  rates:
first,  to  minimize  black  market  premia  (unify  official  and  black  market
exchange  rates)  thereby  increasing  exports  and  eliminating  allocative
inefficiency  and  inequity  through  import  license  rents;  and  second,  absorbing
black  markets  into  the  official  mainstream  through  economic  incentives  rather
than  unenforceable  legislation,  so  as to raise  the  credibility  of economic
policy. Initial  conditions  have included  a rationed  official  market  with  a
managed  (fixed)  rate,  and  a  black  market,  where  the  currency  floats  freely  and
foreign  exchange  is at  a premium. In  contrast  to the  usual  specification  of
dual  exchange  rates,  e.g.,  Lizondo  (1984),  Dornbusch  (1986),  ''mMestic  currency
in  the  dual  regimes  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  not  convertiblt  -ither
commercial  (trade)  or capital  (financial)  transactions  at the j:ficial
exchange  rate. The  black  market  rate  applies  explicitly  or implicitly  to both
sets  of transactions,  serving  as the  marginal  cost,  or implicit  resale  value,
of  foreign  exchange.  1/
one  might  reason  as follows:  if,  in fact,  the  official  exchange  rate
is inframarginal,  then  floating  the  currency  officially  should  result  in  a
unified  rate  that  is  pretty  close  to the  black  market  rate. Further,  post-
float inflation --  rate of currency depreciation --  should be no different
from  that  which  prevailed  In the  black  market  pre-float. In seeking  to  allay
policy-makers'  fears  that  a float  will result  in  a 'free  fall  of the  exchange
rate'  irrespective  of fundamentals,  Quirk  et al. (1987)  point  out  that  the
inflationary  effects  of floating  have wdepended  crucially  on the  monetary  and
fiscal  economic  policies  that  have influenced  the  subsequent  direction  of the
exchange  rate  changes'. They  proceed  to cite  the  example  of Uganda,  where
domestic  prices  had already  adjusted  to  the  black  market  rate  prior  to
floating (which is typically  the case): "The  subsequent surge of inflation
-----  when the  exchange  markets  were  unified  was in response  to  a relaxation
of fiscal policy ---- '.-3-
It  will be argued  here  that,  under  plausible  conditions,  post-
unification  inflation  could  rise  permanently  and substantially  even  if the
level  of real  government  spending  remains  constant. The  surge  in inflation  is
explained  instead  by developing  the  link  between  fiscal  and  exchange  rate
reform  with  high  black  market  premia. This  link  is directs  there  is a
conflict  between  the  allocative  goal  of stimulating  exports  by lowering  the
black  market  premilm  and  the fiscal  goal  of financing  government  spending  with
a limited  menu of  available  tax  instruments.  The  black  market  premium
functions  as an implicit  tax  on exports,  serving  at once  as  a disincentive  to
export  productior.  and  a source  of  hidden  fiscal  revenues. The fiscal  deficit
is financed  by a combination  of seignorage  (the  tax  on  domestic  money)  and  the
implicit  tax  on exports. With  unification,  the  hidden  export  tax  vanishes.
As a result,  there  li a compensating  rise  in the  tax  on  domestic  money,
Inflation.
The  first  part  of the  analytical  model  focuses  on production  and  real
exchange  rates,  formally  interpreting  the  premium  as a tax  on  exports. In
contrast  to other  tax  rates,  e.g.,  a  30 percent  import  tariff,  the  premium  is
an  endogenous  tax  rate,  being  determine'  by the  general  equilibrium  of all  the
asset  prices  in the  economy. Consequently,  the  second  part of the  model
focuses  on the  determnalnts  of the  premium  as a precursor  to  discussing  the
tradeoff  between  the  premium  and  rate  of inflation. These  determinants
include  fiscal,  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy,  asset  preferences  and  the
terms  of trade. UnLfication  through  floats  and  the  Implications  for  inflation
are  then  discussed  both  dynamically  and in  the  steady  state.  The impact  of
accelerated  crawls  and  maxi-devaluatlons  is  also  examined. Lastly,  policy
formulation  and  some  concluding  remarks  are  presented.-4-
TI.  MODEL
Exchange  rate  reform  in  net  Franc  Zone  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  in
LDCs  generally,  is  motivated  by the  linked  goals  of making  external  balance
sustainable  and  increasing  exportg. This  requires  consideration  of export
incentives,  or the  real  exchange  rate  defined  as the  relative  price  of exports
to  nontradables.  There  are  thus  two  goods:  exports  and  home  goods.
There  is  currency  substitution  (Calvo  and  Rodriguez  (1977))  with
residents  holding  two  non-interest  bearing  assets,  domestic  money (cedis)  and
foreign  money (dollars).  The  dynamics  of cedis  are  influenced  by the
financing  of the  fiscal  deficit,  and  of  dollars,  by the  current  account.
Government  Spending  and  Foreign  Exchange  Rationing
For  simplicity,  the  government  spends  only  on imported  goods
including,  importantly,  interest  payments  on historically  contracted  foreign
debtt  no new  foreign  borrowing  is incurred. The  government  buys  dollars  from
the  private  sector  at the  arbitrary  rate,  e, exchangin&  cedis  for  dollars.
These  dollars  are  paid  for  partly  from  conventional  tax  receipts,  which  the
private  sector  pays  in  cedis,  and  partly  by  printing  cedis,  which  covers  the
deficit. The  existence  of a fiscal  deficit  thus  permits  a simultaneous
examination  of the  inflation  tax  on cedis  and  the  implicit  tax  on exports  via
a choice  of e (cedis  per  dollar).
The  government  sets  e arbitrarily,  does  not  have the  reserves  to
deplete  and so  rations  the  official  foreign  exchange  market  by capital
controls  and restrictions  on commercial  transactions.  The  analytical
implication  is  that,  with some  leeway,  official  reserves  in  dollars,  R,  can  be
arbitrarily  chosen. We assume  that  they  are  held  constant,  i.e.,  R - O.
Thus,  a fraction  of private  sector  exports  is surrendered  to the  government  at
rate  e for  cedis. The  government  uses  this  to finance  its  own  spending,  which- ;  -
is  exclusively  on imports,  giving  the remainder  back to the private  sector
also at rate e.  There is consequently  no net official  accumulation  of
dollars.
The rationing  schemt - the previous  paragraph  amounts  to a
redistribution  within the priv* e sector  coupled  with an 'mplicit  net tax
transfer  to the government,  the source  of this tax  being the premium  on
dollars  in a black  market,  where the exchange  rate is b 2 e.  The black
market, or free  market, arises  precisely  because the  official  market is
rationed.  Domestic  currency is freely  convertible  in the floating  black
market at rate  b, which is the  marginal  cost of foreign  exchange. Dollars
obtained  officially  can be re-sold,  or at an7 rate,  imports  purchased  with
official  dollars  are priced in  domestic  currency  at their  opportunity  cost,
the black  market rate.  This is  precisely  what gives rise to  rents  in  the
presence  of rationing  through import  licenses.
Exporters  either  ship their  exports  through  official  channels,
earning  the rate  e, or smuggle  them,  at rate  b.  There are no real  resource
costs  of smuggling,  but there  are private  costs of smuggling.  2/  These
consist  of bribes  paid to  various officials.  The  marginal cost  of these
bribes increases  with the  volume  of exports  smuggled.  Exporters  equate  the
marginel returns  between the  official  and black  markets in  equilibrium.
Consequently,  the  marginal  return  on exports is the official  rate  e.  This
creates  an asymmetry  between importers  and exporters.  For importers,  e is
infra-marginal  and irrelevant;  for  exporters,  e is  the marginal  return.  It is
precisely  this difference  that leads  simultaneously  to import  license  rents
and to the black  market premium  being interpreted  as a tax  on exports.
In the above regime,  e has an exogenously  chosen rate  of
depreciation,  ele  - A 2  0.  This, in conjunction  with a given real  fiscal
deficit  and the assumption  that  R - 0  is  equivalent  to a  money supply  rule,
as we shall see later.- 6-
Production  and  Real Exchanse  Rate
The  approach  here  follows  Kharas  and  Plnto  (1987).  There  le  no
capital,  and  the  given  endowment  of labor,  C, is  fully  eployed,  being
allocated  between  two  goods  an  export  good,  and  a  hom  good,  which  also
requires  intermediate  Imports.  The  private  sector  spends  only  on  hbas  goods,
domestic  consumption  of  the  exoort  good  being  negligible.
Home  goods,  H,  with  price  PH,  re  produced  by a  Cobb-Douglas
technology  using  imported  Inputs  (oil),  I,  and  labor,  L1. 31  Imports  are
valued  at  their  marginal  cost,  b.  Exports  are  produced  using  a  constant-
returns-to-scale  technology,  X  - L. Of total  *xports,  X, X2 is  smuggled  out
and  X3  surrendered  to  the  government  at  rate  e. C(X 2) Is  a strictly  convex
function  representing  private  costs  of smuggiLng  (bribes)  in  terms  of  exports
with  C()M-O  and  C',  C0>0. The  private  sector  solves  the  following  problem,
where  w  is  the  domestic  currency  wage  and  Px the  dollar  price  of  exports.  The
dollar  price  of imports  is  unity:
(1) max  pHH  +  bPX 2+ *PxX 3- bPxC(X 2) - w(L 1+ L2+ L3) - bI
s.t.  H  c L  0  .e  10,I)
xi  Li  (i-2,3)
,i,Li  I  L
I,  L  > O  (i-1,2,3).
The  solution  to (1)  based  on the  FOC  may  be  described  as follows:  total
exports  are  distributed  between  the  official  market  (X 3) and  the  black  market
(X 2) by  equating  marginal  returns,  i.e.,  by setting  bpx(l  - C'(X 2))  -*Px  - w.
Let  c  I (C')- 1. We  obtain  the  export  smuggling  function
(2) X2 - c (1  - 1/#),
where #  ' b/e is the  black  market  premium.  Since c' > 0,  dX2/d#  >  0, so  that-7-
the  incentive  to smuggle  increases  as the  premium  rises.
With  regard  to  home goods,  it  must  be the  case  that  in  equilibrium,
PH-  k(a)  wb,  where  k is  a constant  depending  on a.  Using  the  FOC  that
i-a  a ep1 - w, it follows  that  PH  k(e)  e #  Px
The  current  account  in  dollars  is given  by Px(X2  +  X3)  - I - g,  where
I is intermediate  imports  and  g is government  spending  on imports,  fixed  in
dollars.  Consequently, px(X2 +  X3)  - I - g - F +  R, the RHS of the equality
denoting  foreign  asset  accumulation.  F is  the  stock  of dollars  held in
private  portfolios.  Recalling  that  R - 0, it follot-s  that
(3)  Px(X2 +  X3)  - I +  g  +  F.
Consequently, in steady state  with F  - 0, I - pxX-g,  where X - X2 +  X3 is
a  1-a
total  exports. Substituting  into  H - I  (see  (1))  gives  the  steady  state
technological  relationship  between  H and  X,
(4) H  (LE-  X)  (pxXa  g)ia  ,
since  X - - L1. It is  easy  to  verify  that  H.  <  0 so that  H is a strictly
concave  function  of  X.  Further,  H - 0  when  X - g/ps  or  when  X - E.  We
require  that  pxL  >  g, i.e.,  that  the  maximum  feasible  supply  of dollars  exceed
the  government's  requirements.
The  PPF  is shown  graphically  in  Fig.  1.  At X - X* - (1-a)E  +
a(gIpx),  Hx - 0.  Since  domestic  residents  consume  only  home  goods,  it  follows
that  the  optimal  point  to  produce  at  is  X*,  where  H  is  maximized.
Fig.  1  near  here
Where  does  production  actually  take  place? From (1),  we  know  that
(1  - a) pHH - bI and that aPHH - wLl.  Using these FOC and X2 - L2, X3 - L3
with (3)  yields:(5) LI  '  p1  - a  +p  at)  - I ,(1 -a)  (PD,4.F-R)
Let  Xopt  denote  the  steady  state  solution  to (1). Since  Xopt- C  - Ll, using
(5)  with F  - 0,  we get X(Pt-  ((1  - a)E  +  ao(g/px)](l  - a  +  at).  Since 0  2 1,
ft  follows  that  XoPt  5  X*,  with  XOPt  - X*  when  0  - 1, i.e.,  the  expsrt  tax  via
t  is  eliminated.  When  X - XoPt, Hx  - bpx(l  - l1/)/pH,  which  is zero  when t -
1.  This  expression  is  merely  the  ratio  of the  marginal  costs  of smugp  g to
price  of home  goods. 4/  So long  as t  > 1,  XOPt  c  X* and  consumption  ox  home
goods  is less  than  its  maximum  feasible  level  corresponding  to  X*.  Not  only
does  this  capture  the  production  distortion  as a result  of the  export  tax  via
r,  it also  captures  the  notion  of import  compression  and  its  effect  on lower
GDP  growth  as a result  of stunted  exports,  a  major  preoccupation  in  many LDCs
today. The  bottomline  is  that  in  order  to stimulate  exports,  t must  be
reduced. This  is the  allocative  goal  that  is  pursued.
In the  circumstances,  a natural  candidate  for  the  real  exchange  rate
is  epx/pH,  the  relative  marginal  returns  of  exports  and  home  goods. This
works  out  to  be k-l(pxI1)l 1 . since  PH - k(a)(epx)abl-a.  In  order  to raise
the  relative  return  of  exports  and  thereby  the  inceAtives  to  produce  them,  t
must  clearly  be reduced,  which  is  consistent  with  our  earlier  observations.
Proposition  l:  In order  to  depreciate  the  real  exchange  rate  and improve
production  incentives  for  exports,  the  black  market  premium  must  be lowered.
Proofs Obvious  from  above  discussice  And  Fig.  1.
Inflation  Tax,  Portfolio  Balance  and  the  Premium
Since  reducing  t stimulates  exports,  we now focus  on the  determinants
of t.  This  brings  us to the  monetary  part  of the  model. The  main ideas  from
the  real  part  of the  model  are  that *  must  be reduced  if  exports  and real
income  are  to be raised,  which  is  obvious  from  Fig.  1.  We simplify  the  rest
of the  presentation  by setting  a  - 0, i.e.,  home  goods  are  produced  with-9-
intermediate  imports  only.  This  makes the algebra  more elegant,  but does  not
in any  way change  the results  we now present  on the  trade-off  between  the tax
on exports  and the inflation  t  x (see  Kharas  and Pinto (1987)). This is
because  these  results  are driven  by the financing  of the fiscal  deficit  and
the asset  demand  for dollars.
Setting  a - 0  means that  the  private sector,  like the  government,
spenes  only  on imported  goods,  which is  the assumption  in Lizondo (1984)
and Pinto (1986). All production,  pL,  lis now exported  and  consumption,
imported. Eq. (3)  can therefore  be rewritten  as F - pxL - g - I.  where  I
is  now private  consumption.
Private  residents  spend  a fixed  fraction,  a, of their  nominal
financial  wealth,  W - M +  bF,  where M is  the stock  of cedis in private
portfolios  and F is  converted  from  dollars  into  cedis  at the (relevant)  black
market rate,  b.  Thus,  bI - a(M +  bF).  This, in conjunction  with
F  - p  - g - I  yields the  dynamic  equation:
(6)  F-p  L -g  - a(m/  +  F),
where  m  M/e, recalling  that *  - b/e.
The  dynamic  equation  for  M is provided  by the financing  of the
deficit.  ie  assume that  government  spending,  g, and taxes,  t, are fixed in
dollars.  The deficit  is financed  by domestic  credit,  D.  Since  R - O it
follows  that:
(7)  M  D - e(g-t),
with the deficit  being converted  into  cedis at the official  exchange  rate,  e.
Since  m E  M/e,  we get:
(8)  n - (g-t'  - me,
where e  - e/e>O is the official  rate  of depreciation.- 10  _
The  system  is  completed  by a  portfolio  balance  equation.  Let  A be
the  fraction  of  wealth  W -11 + bF  held  as  domestic  money. Since  interest
rates  are  abstracted  from,  the  relevant  differential  rate  of return  between  M
and  F  is  the  rate  of  depreciation  'of  the  cedi  in  the  black  market,  b=b/b.
Continuous  asset-market  clearing  and  perfect  foresight  yield
X(b)  <0 (9)  M  . bF ,  ()  '  O*
l-X(b)
An obvious  problem  with  multi-asset  nerfect  foresight  models  is  that
there  is  no apparent  motive  for  a  diversified  portfolio.  Eq.(9)  is
rationalized  as  capturing  an  aggregation  over  many  consumers  with  dispersed
expectations.  Using  m  '  M/e  and  #  _ b/e,  (9)  can  be  rewrittent
(10)  m . A  .)F.
Equations  (6),  (8)  and  (10)  are  the  dynamic  equations  of the  system. From  (8),
it  is  evident  that  a  choice  of (g-t)  and  e  is  equivalent  to  the  choice  of  a
money  supply  rule. The  steady-state  solution  (i.  F, n)  - (0,  0, 0)  is:  5/
(11)  '  a()
(12)  F*  - (l-X(e))  . . a
(13)  m* - (g-t)/e.
By  definition,  in  the  steady  state,  b  and  e  depreciate  at the  same  rate,  C.
which  is  also  the  steady-stat,  rate  of inflation.  Further,  the  deficit  (g-t)  is
financed  by  the  inflation  tax,  m*.e.
Trade-off  between  Tax  on  Exports  and  Inflation  Tax
An interesting  result  is  that  the  steady  state  solution  (11)  - (13)  is
unique  and  saddle-point  stable  for  e >  0  and  belonging  to  some  interval  of  the
positive  real  line.  6/ The  bounds  on this  continuum  are  set  by  the  resultant
values  of #*, since  from (11),  #* depends  upon e.  Thus, #* should  not exceed- 11 -
#,  where  i  has  that  property  that  pxX 3- 8,  ensuring  consistency  between  the
rationing  scheme  and  money  supply  rule  (otherwise,  the  government  would  not
get  enough  dollars  to  meets  its  requirements).  f  can  be  derived  from  eq.  (2),
noting  that  X  - X2 There  is  also  an implied  lower-bound  for *.  e.  In
order  to  define  it  precisely,  we need  to  discuss  the  inflation  tax.
By  definition,  the  inflation  tax  can  be levied  only  on  domestic
money,  and  not  on  dollars.  The  proceeds  from  seignorage,  m*.6,  depend  upon
the  rate  of the  tax,  e,  the  share  of  domestic  money  in  wealth,  X,  and  total
financial  wealth. We shall  refer  to  the  expression  (M).  I 9(Q)  on  the
R.H.S.  of  eq. (11)  as  the  unit  inflation  tax. Define  I  as  as  the  inflation
elisticity  of  domestic  money  demand,  I  1 -\'(X).e/X(e)  Assume  that  v  rises
with  e  so  that  O(S)  has  the  shape  of  a  Laffer  curve  with  a global  maximum  when
I  - 1. This  in  turn  implies,  from  eq.  (11),  that  O* is  u-shaped  function  of  e
with  a  global  minimum  when  v  - 1. Hore  formally,  we obtain  the  following
comparative  static  result  from  (11)  (see  also  Lizondo  (1984).  who first
obtained  this  result):
(14)  d  -*  a * (a-t)  *  0-1)  >  0 if  7>  1
dO  PXL-g  OW().e  c  0  if  v<  1.
Assuming  v  rises  with  e yields  a  u-shaped  curve,  shown  as  P*(*)  in  Fig.  2.
Fig.  2  near  here
Eq.  (14)  has  an  interesting  interpretation:  if  domestic  money  demand
is  inflation-inelastic,  a rise  in  the  rate  of  crawl  will  lower  the  steady-
state  premium  (between  0  and  B in  Fig.  2). On  the  other  hand,  if  1  > 1,  i.e.,
e  exceeds  the  seignorage  maximizing  rate,  increasing  e  actually  raises  **  (to
the  right  of  B in  Fig.  2). The  intuition  is  that  a  rise  in  0  will,  in  the  new
steady  state,  raise  the  differential  rate  of  return  between  H and  F,
increasing  the  desirability  of  F.  This  by itself  would  raise  *;  but  e  also
affects  the  unit  inflation  tax,  leading  to  the  ambiguity.- 12 -
Notice  that  in Fig.  2. the  minimum-point  on the  [*(e)  curve
(corresponding  to  B on the  x-axis)  is less  than  1.  This  is  equivalent  to
assuming  that  it  would  be feasible  for  the  government  to finance  its  deficit
entirely  by the  inflatior,  tax,  should  it  choose  to.  Further,  in the  dual
regime,  it  is analytically  desirable  that  !  >  1,  owing  to rationing. These
considerations  together  imply  that  f  - 1.  Thus,  the  relevant  trade-off
between  0 and  #  is  between  A and  wl on the  x-axis,  and  the  segment  CD on the
#*(e)  curve  in Fig.  2.  This  trade-off  exists  iff  v  <  1.  Further,  the  model
and  steady-state  equilibrium  solution  do not  apply  between  il and  rh . since
for  an  a  in  this  interval,  seignorage  exceeds  the  deficit  and  foreign  exchange
is  bought  at an official  premium,  rather  than  discount,  relative  to the  black
market.
We shall  assume  the  following  cotnditions  are  satisfiedt
*  f  (1,  )
(15)
< 1  (a  e  (A,  I1)  in  Fig. 2).
Proposition  2:  Given  conditions  (15),  there  is  a trade-off  between  #  and  e in
financing  the  fiscal  deficit,  (g-t).
Proof: Equation  (11)  can  be rewritten:
(16)  0*.O(G) - a *  s-8
since  the  R.H.S  of (16)  is  exogenous  and  assumed  held  constant,  it  follows
that  a fall  in  O* must be compensated  by a rise  in  G(b),  therefore  a rise  in  a
since  v  <  1.  In  other  wcrds,  a decline  in  the  tax  on exports  requires  an
increase  in  the  rate  of inflation.
The  scope  of this  trade-off  is  affected  by changes  in  g and  p,:  a
rise  in  g  with 0 fixed  raises  the  required  base  for  the  inflation  tax  and
hence  the  stock  of  cedis  that  must  be  held. As a result,  the  premium  on- 13 -
dollars  rises. A fall  in  pyx  (TOT  deterioration)  affects  F negatively,  hence
raises  t*.  In terms  of  Fig.  2, a rise  in g  or fall  in  Px shifts  #*(e)
upwards,  lowers  #  and  raises  V1 l  reducing  the  scope  for  a trade-off.  Both
comparative  static  results,  d#*/dg  > 0 and  d#*Idpx  <  0, can  be formally
derived  from  eq.(11).
A precise  expression  is  now  derived  for  the  implicit  tax  on  exports
in steady  state  via  the  premium. First,  for  the  private  sector,  the  real
stock  of cedis  is  M/b,  and  not  m -M/e.  Accordingly,  the  relevant  capital
loss  from  the  inflation  tax  in steady  state  is (MHb).#  - m*.§/I. Second,  from
eq. (7),  cedi  taxes  - et,  so that  the  real  tax  burden  is  et/b  - t/t*  in steady
state. Since  the  private  sector's  net loss  is  the  government's  gain,  it
follows  that  the  residue  is the  implicit  tax  on exporters,  given  by
g-(m*.eI/#+  t/I)  - g(l  - l/4). More  mechanically,  reorganizing  eq. (13)
yieldst
(17)  g - m*e  +  t  g(l-  1)+  t  +  m
If t 2 2, i.e.,  there  is  a 100  percent  premium  on foreign  exchange  in  the
conventional  sense--a  common  situation  in Sub-Saharan  Africa--this  revenue
finances  upwards  of 50  percent  of government  spending  on imports  and  interest
payments  on foreign  debtl
Unification  Through  Overnight  Floats  and  Inflation
Assume,  to start  with,  that  there  is a  genuine  trade-off  between  t
and e  as discussed  earlier  in  the  context  of Fig.  2.  The 'real  deficit"
continues  to refer  to (g-t),  i.e,  the  number  we would  get  by looking  at the
fiscal  accounts  available  at  any  Ministry  of Finance. Thus,  revenues  from
both  the  inflation  tax  and  implicit  tax  on exporters  via t are  excluded  in
computing  the  real  deficit. The reason  for  this  reminder  will become
apparent.- 14 -
Proposition  3: Assume  conditions  (15)  hold  and  that  (g-t)  and  Px are  given.
Then  if the  currency  is floated  overnight  (rationing  is  eliminated  and  the
official  rate  of depreciation  endogenized),  post-  unification  inflation  will
rise  in  the  new steady  state,  i.e.,  there  will  be a permanent  increase  in
inflation.
Prooft Let  u-b-e  denote  the  unified  floating  exchange  rate,  and  a  denote  its
now  endogenous  rate  of depreciation.  The  new dynamic  system  consists  of  eqs.
(6),  (8)  e-d (10),  with e  - u and  #  - 1.  In particular,  m is redefined  as
M/u,  and  in the  new steady  state,  t* - 1.  Consider  eq. (16),  noting  that  0 is
the  rate  of inflation  just  before  floating. Since  the  R.H.S.  of (16)  is
constant,  and  0*  >  1 prior  to  the  float,  it  must  be the  case  that  0(a)  > 9(e)
if the  inflation  tax  is to finance  the  deficit  in the  new  steady  state. But,
from  (15),  5 C  1.  Therefore,  a  >  0. In fact,  a  - fl >  e,  where rl  is  shown  in
Fig.  2.
The  intuition  is simple:  by unifying,  the  government  loses  the  tax
revenues  implicit  in  the  premium,  g(l-l/) (eq.  (17)). In the  absence  of
changes  in  fiscal  policy,  it  must  replace  this  tax  on  exports  with  a higher
tax  on  money. Obviously,  the  larger  the  tax  on exports  (the  larger  #* is,
equivalently,  the  smaller  e is)  to  begin  with,  the  bigger  the  jump  in
inflation  upon  floating.
Fig.  3  near  here
Fig.  3 summarizes  the  outcome. Since,  upon  unification,
(18)  e(c)  3A(*).*  .*
and  the  R.H.S.  of (18)  is a  constant,  it follows  that  there  are  two  possible
steady-state  equilibria,  Jr  and rh  as shown  in  Fig.  3.  These  are  the  same  as
the  fl and rh  in  Fig.  1 for  given  (g-t)  and  Px  71  In accordance  with
standard  results  (e.g..  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1985)),  rl  is  saddle  point
stable,  and rh  completely  locally  stable,  given  rational  expectations.  8/- 15  -
Proposition  4:  Assume,  with given  (g-t)  and  Px' that  the  currency  is floated
overnight,  unifying  the  official  and  black  market  exchange  rates. Of the  two
possible  steady-state  equilibria,  wl and  1'h  (Fig.  3),  i1 (1  <  1) is saddle-
point  stable,  and  Th (9  >  1)  completely  locally  stable,  under  rational
expectations.
Proof: Set  #  - 1 in  eq. (6),  (8)  and (10)  and  replace  e  with  u.  This  is the
new  dynamic  system. Redefine  m as  M/u,  noting  that  it  is  now  a jump  variable.
Invert (10) to yield Q  - #(m/F), where t  E/(1-X)1-l,  t'  <  0.  This yields
the (2  x 2) system:
(19)  F =  pL  - g - a (m  +  F)
(20)  m - (g - t)  - mf(m/F), #'  <  0.
When  the  system,  (P,  m), is linearized  around  the  steady-state  solution,  the
re.evant determinant A  - af(l - 1/v), noting that t'  - (l-)_)2/'  and recalling
recalling  thatt  v  _ -X'!/X. Since  we have  one  pre-determined  variable,  F, and
one  jump  variable,  m S M/u,  saddle-point  stability  requires  that  A  <  0.  Since
a  >  0, the  saddle-point  stability  of rl  follows. rh  can  be shown  to  be
completely  locally  stable  by showing  that  A >  0  and  the  trace,  given  by
[-a  +  a  ((1-X)/v-1)],  negative  when  1>1.
What  are  the  dynamics  of inflation  upon floating?  We assume  that  upon
floating,  the  economy  gravitates  to the  low-inflation  equilibrium,  91  for  the
same  reason  as in  the  closed-economy  literature:  this  equilibrium  is saddle-
point  stable  (Proposition  4) and  therefore  implies  a  unique  dynamic  path  for  the
price  level  and inflation.
Given  conditions  (15),  inflation  will  be  higher  in  the  new steady
state,  so that  the  desired  steady  state  ratio  and  level  of F  will rise,  implying
a dynamic  path  for  inflation. Fig.  4  presents  the  phase  diagram  in  m-F  space
for  the  system  (19)-(20).  The  curve  F-O  is shown  as the  downward  sloping  line,
FF,  with slope  -1.  MM  is  the  m=O  curve. Its  slope  is  derived  in the  appendix.- 16 -
D is the  dual regime  equilibriums  the ratio  of domestic  to foreign  assets
\/(1-)k))  is  higher  and Inflation,  lower.  E is  the saddle-point  stable  low
inflation  equilibrium  ('1  m*, F*),  with higher inflation  and therefore  a lower
domestic-to-foreign  asset ratio,  (rl)I(1-)dr 1))=m*IF*.
Fig. 4 near  here
VV is the  positively  sloped  saddle  path leading  to E.  Since  F is
higher  in the  new steady  state,  current  account  surpluses  need to be generated.
By (19),  this requires  a reduction  in (m+F). With F sticky,  m_M/u jumps to the
point '  on VV.  The economy  then  converges  to E along  VV.  From Fig. 4,  we see
that  whether inflation  overshoots  or undershoots  its  new steady  state level,  rl,
depends  upon  whether  VV is flatter  or steeper  then  the line  OE  with slope  m*/F*.
If the  slope  of VV equals  m*/F*, then inflation  will jump immediately  to  fl1
The precise  condition  is derived  in the  Appendix  as  eq. (25)  and graphed  in  Fig.
5.
Fig. 5 near  here
It turns  out thac if  a/sl >  (l-X(1 1)], the inxflation  rate  will
overshoot 'l. Otherwise,  it  will undershoot  rl  Assume X(Q) is a Cagan-type
portfolio  equation,  \(Q)  - ,e-7(,  X0 e  (0,l).  At Q* in Fig. 5,  which plots
condition (25)  (see  Appendix),  a/Q - (1  - X(Q)].  Therefore,  if wl  <  (>)  Q*,  we
observe  overshooting  (undershooting). The  determinants  of Q*  are portfolio
preferences  (as  parameterized  by k, and  7) and  the speed  at  which dollars  can  be
accumulated  (as  determined  by the  propensity  to spend  out of  wealth, a).  The
determinants  of rl include  these  as  well as the fiscal  deficit
(recall from Fig.  3 that X(r 1 ).i 1 - a(g - t)/(pxL  - g)).  Suppose  7 goes down
(desired  ratio  of dollars  in  wealth goes  down at each level  of inflation)  and a
goes up (larger  current  account  surpluses  will be generated  for  a given
reduction  in  wealth).  Then from  Fig. 5,  Q* goes up and from  Fig. 3. Nj  goes
down (unit  inflation  tax  curve rises)  increasing  the chances  of overshooting.
Table  1 computes  approximate  values  of t*  for  different  parameter
levels.- 17 -
Table  1:  Illustrative  Computation  of  Values  for  G*
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Case  a  X0  7  *  *
(Z  per  year)
A  0.05  0.85  0.50  200  21
B  0.10  0.85  0.20  500  45
C  0.10  0.90  0.20  500  53
D  0.10  0.90  0.10  1000  64
Case  A assumes  reasonably  that  5  percent  of  wealth  is  consumed  per
year. At zero  inflation,  85 percent  of  wealth  is  held  as cedis  (Xo  - 0.85). 7
is  0.50,  implying  a seignorage-maximizing  rate  of inflation  (X*,  col. (5))  of
200  percent/year. Q  is roughly  21  percent/year.  In  case  B, a  is raised  to  10
percent  and  W* to 500  percent/year,  with  0* rising  to 45 percent/year.  Case  C
raises  )o to 0.90. Case  D is  the  most  conservative,  with a  - 0.10,  )O  - 0.90
and  1*  =  1000  percent/year.  Yet,  0* rises  modestly  to 64  percent/year.
Since  prevailing  inflation  rates  prior  to floating  are  lower-bounds  for
w1 under  conditions  (15),  undershooting  of inflation  is  empirically  a  distinct
possibility  for  many of the  empirical  cases  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
The  bottomline  of this  section  has  two  partss first,  in  any  event,
inflation  will rise  in  the  new  steady  state;  second,  to  know  whether  inflation
is  going  to overshoot  or  undershoot,  we must  know  w 1 and  u*.  Otherwise,  we
cannot  offer  the  comfort  that  the  rise  in inflation  is  transitory  and  that
inflation  will  eventually  decline.
Exchange  Rate  Rules
We now  consider  official  exchange  rate  rules  that  attempt  to lower  the
premium. From  eq. (11),  we see  that  the  steady-state  solution  for *  is
independent  of the  level  of the  official  rate,  e.  One-shot  devaluations  will
therefore  reduce  the  premium  only  temporarily.  9/  The  reason  is that  growth
rates  and  monetary  dynamics  do not  change  fundamentally.  Some  intuition  is- 18 -
provided  for  this  result  in  Fig.  6.  The  downward  sloping  line  plots  eq. (8),
m - (g-t)  - m#.  To simplify,  assume  we are  in steady  state  to start  with,  and
that  the  devaluation  is  unanticipated.  As a result  of the devaluation,  m,
which  is  usually  sticky,  jumps  from  m* to  ml in  Fig.  6, so that  m jumps  to
A >  0.  Since  F is sticky,  #  must decline  to ensure  portfolio  balance.
However,  as  m returns  from  mi to  m*,  #  returns  to its  original  value (see  Pinto
(1986)  for  explicit  dynamics). A devaluation  which  accompanies  a reduction  in  g
will,  however,  speed  up adjustment  to a  new steady  state  where  #  is  permanently
lower.
Fig.  6  near  here
In  contrast,  if e  is increased,  0  will  go up or  down  depending  on
whether  e  is  beyond rh,  or between  A  and  91, to start  with, in  Fig.  2.  This
result  has  already  been  discussed  above:  accelerating  e will  work only  if
i7<1.  If  #>Th  to start  with, a reduction  in  0  will  be unambiguously  beneficial,
since  both  the  premium  and  rate  of inflation  decline.  10/  It is important  to
note  however,  that  for  such  high inflation  situations,  attempts  to  halt
inflation  in its tracks  through  exchange  rate  freezes  (0-O)  will  not  work  unless
g and (g-t)  are drastically  reduced. Otherwise,  there  is  no steady-state
solution  for  m or *,  and  i  equals  G,  which approximates  the  growth  rate  of
base  money. ll/ A policy  switch  will be forced  when  i  is  hit.  In such  cases,
inflation  will rise  rapidly  and  by a large  amount  if  the  policy  change  includes
an overnight  float  (see  Proposition  3).
Another  possibility  is  motivated  by the  erroneous  argument  that  the
equilibrium  exchange  rate,  e*,  is some  weighted  average  of  b and  e, rather  than
being  determined  on the  margin.  Thus,  e* - pb * (l-p)e,  pe(Ol).  and  advice  is
to  move towards  e*.  This  unwittingly  links  official  depreciation  to the
premium:  e - e*-e  - P(b-e),  or, 0 =  p(#-l).  Such  a policy  could  set  up  a
destabilizing  spiral  of higher  premia  and  rising  depreciation,  raising
inflation  (see  Kharas  and  Pinto (1987)  for  an example).- 19  -
III. EXAMPLES  FROh  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
Why  does  the  government  trade  off  the  premium  with the  rate  of
inflation?  Typically,  exports  originate  in  agriculture,  with the  bulk  of
import  licenses  going  to  urban  manufacturing.  The  gainers  and  losers  in  the
event  of unification,  are  shown  below:
Gainers  Losers
- Government  - Farmers
Dual Regime  - Import license  - Domestic currency
recipients  holders
- Government  - Former import
Unified  Regime  - Farmers  license  holders
- Domestic currency
holders
The trade-off  thus  potentially  has strong  urban-rural  redistribution
connotations.  The  distributive  effects  of the  higher  inflation  tax  upon
unification  depend  upon  who holds  domestic  currency. One  could  argue  that  the
urban,  rent-seeking  sector  is  able  to hedge  itself  by acquiring  dollars,  so
that  the  inflation  tax  is regressive,  affecting  the  urban  and  rural  poor.
Examples  of relevant  countries  are  Ghana,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and
Uganda.  12/  Stereotypically,  there  is  a single  export,  cocoa. Part  of the
cocoa  is surrendered  through  a commodity  board  to the  government,  which  sets
prices  with reference  to the  official  exchange  rate. The  rest  is smuggled  out
for  hard  currency. Equivalently,  cocoa  is  exported  directly  by the  producers,
with some  fraction  surrendered  to the  government  at the  official  exchange  rate.
For  countries  like  Nigeria,  which  is  a  net seller  of foreign  exchange
to the  private  sector,  rationing  implies  a real  transfer  from  the  government  to
the  private  sector  which  is  proportional  to  the  dollar  value  of import  licenses- 20 -
issued. Tax receipts  and  the  real  deficit  therefore  are  not independent  of the
premium. In  terms  of Fig.  3, the  horizontal  line  with intercept
a.(g-t)/(pxE-g)  will  move  downwards  upon  unification,  lowering  71*  The
incentive  effects  of exchange  rate  reform,  however,  apply  to  non-oil  exports.
Hereafter,  we concentrate  on the  more  common  'net  buyer"  cases  extension  to
the *net  seller"  case  is straightforward.  13/
In terms  of  mechanics,  exchange  rate  rules  have  not  worked  well.
Devaluations  are  not  generally  accompanied  by a relaxation  of rationing. The
theoretical  result  that  the  premium  in steady  state  is independent  of the
level  of the  official  rate  and  therefore  will decline  only  temporarily  with
one-step  devaluations  has  received  considerable  empirical  support: Somalia  in
1985,  when the  goal  of unifying  the  official  and  free  rates  by  December  was
thwarted  by almost  immediatL  equivalent  upward  movements  in  the  free  ratel
Sudan  in  recent  times;  Zaire  and  Zambia  in  the  two  or three  years  before  they
adopted  floating  rates. Such  temporary  depreciations  of the  real  exchange
rate  are  not  likely  to stimulate  new,  permanent  commitments  to  the  export
sector.
Accelerating  the  official  rate  of  depreciation  above  prevailing  rates
of inflation  will  work  only  if  conditions  (15)  are satisfied.  Thus,  if
prevailing  inflation  exceeds  rh  in  Fig.  2,  #  will rise. A pre-emptive  shift
into  dollars  to escape  the  higher  inflation  tax  will accelerate  this  process
and  raise  inflation  today  via  unpleasant  monetarist  arguments  (Sargent  and
Wallace  (1984)).
Overnight  vs.  Gradual  Reform
Policymakers  in  countries  with  high  black  market  premia  face  a
dilemmat either  they  live  with  misallocated  resources,  inequitable  transfers,
stunted  exports  and  lower  real  income;  or they  float,  raising  inflation
substantially  with  high  political  and  social  costs.  14/- 21 -
A middle ground is  provided  by the recent  experience  of Ghana.  It
initiated  a recovery  program in  April, 1983,  when the  black  market  exchange
rate  was over  60 cedis per dollar,  and the official  rate,  a mere 2.75  cedis
per dollarl  Inflation  was over 100  percent  per year.  15/  In a nutshell,
Ghana's strategy  has been one of a  gradual  reduction  of the fiscal  deficit,
accompanied  by an equally  gradual  relaxation  of rationing,  and supported  by
large,  discrete  devaluations  to speed  up adjustment  to a  lower  premium.
Rationing  has been relaxed  imaginatively,  through  the gradual  transfer  of
commercial  transactions  from the  official  to the  black  market.  This  was
formalized  by the introduction  in  October,  1985,  of a broad-based  special
import  license  scheme  for imports  through  the  black  market.  Such recognition
of the black  market is an important  psychological  step ln eventual
unification.
This  was followed  in September,  1986  by an auction.  Through  a series
of maxi-devaluations,  the  official  rate  had been  moved from  2.75 to 90 cedis
per  dollar,  but still represented  a substantial  discount  relative  to the black
market,  where the rate  was roughly  180  cedis per  dollar (o  was reduced  from
over 20 in  April,  1983 to 2 by September  1986).  It  was therefore  decided to
split  the official  market into  a fixed rate  tier  and a freely  determined  rate
through  an auction  with restricted  access.  This step represented  essentially
the  continued  taxation  of cocoa  and subsidization  of petroleum.
These  markets  were unified  at the  auction rate  in  March, 1987.
Future  steps  involve  merging the  auction,  which  has restricted  access,  with
the  black  market.
In contrast  to the  more-or-less  overnight  measures in Sierra  Leone,
Ghana's  program  appears  painfully  slow,  having lasted  for  over four  years,
with unification  still in  process.  There is an important  argument  in favor  of
such  gradualismt  fiscal  reform  is  much more time-consuming  than  exchange  rate
reform,  which  can be introduced  instantly. The reasons  are the  weakness  of
institutional  mechanisms,  credibility  issues  and political  will. 16/- 22 -
Ironically,  in  Sierra  Leone,  the  tax/GDP  ratio  declined  monotonically
from  16.5  percent  in  1978/79  to  5.6  percent  in  1985/86,  and  fiscal  discipline
was  at its  weakest  when the  currency  was floated. Credibility  was low,  with
the  arrears  position  so  extreme  that  Sierra  Leone  was  paying  upto  20  percent
above  spot  international  prices  for  rice  and  petroleum,  an almost  unheard-of
situation. To float  the  currency  under  such  circumstances,  when  #  was between
3  and  4, implying  a 3ubstantial  exports  tax,  is at least  questionable  (recall
that  the  export  tax  is (l-(l/#)).
IV.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Paradoxically  the  first  step  in  exchange  rate  reform  for  "high  *"
countries  must  be a fiscal  one:  g  sting the  budget  to fix  the  size  of the
implicit  tax  revenues  from  exports  via t.  The  tax-subsidy  redistribution
within  the  private  sector  as a result  of foreign  exchange  rationing  is  also
important.  This  involves  identifying  the  potential  gainers  (e.g.,
agriculture)  and losers  (e.g.,  commerce,  protected  manufacturing  using
imported  inputs)  in  the  event  of  unification. Such  identification  will  make
plain  the  political  pressure  points  likely  to  emerge  upon  unification.
Three  key issues  arises  (1)  To  what  extent  and  how  quickly  can
government  spending  be reduced?  (2)  Are existing  tax  instruments  apart  from
the  premium  and  rate  of inflation  being  used  to  the  hilt,  or  are  the  latter
being  used  as the  easy  way out (see  Aizenman  (1986)  for  a  welfare  analysis  of
a related  issue)?  17/ (3)  Is there  an equitable  distribution  of the  tax  burden
based  on Ramsey-type  considerations?
The  main  policy  conclusion  is that  if  policy  credibility  is low  and
the  initial  level  of the  premium  high,  with significant  revenue  and
redistributive  implications,  the  pace  of reform  should  be set  by the  feasible
speed  of fiscal  reform. Accelerating  rates  of depreciation  above  prevailing- 23 -
inflation  in the  absence  of credible  fiscal  reform  could  result  in  perverse
black  market  premium  response,  jeopardizing  the  survival  of both fiscal  and
exchange  rate  reform. Moreover,  such  policy  will  not  succeed  in real
depreciation  unless  the  premium  falls. Likewise,  overnight  adoption  of floats
is likely  to  meet  with considerable  political  and  social  opposition  as
inflation  rises,  creating  the  possibility  of policy  reversals. The *best
route,  consequently,  might  be to gradually  relax  rationing,  accompanying  this
with  discrete  devaluations,  with the  pace  of reform  being  set  by the  speed  of
fiscal  reforms there  are  no quick  fixes. Lastly,  it  would  be incorrect  to
conclude  from  this  study  that  an LDC  should  never  float  its  currency. Thiu
decision  should  -)pend  upon  the  credibility  and  speed  of accompanying  fiscal
reform  and  the  initial  size  of the  premium.- 24 -
Footnotes
1.  The  recent  experience  of Bolivia,  Ghana,  Nigeria,  Somalia  and  Zaire  suggest
a  wide  coverage  of the ideas  expressed  here.  Quirk  et al. (1987)  document
the  recent  experience  of several  developing  countries  with floating  exchange
rates.
2.  The  Zirst  reason  for  ignoring  resource  costs  of smuggling  is  that  the  issue
has  already  been  researched.  The  second  is that  for  many  LDCs,  they  do not
seem  to  be e  major  issue: a cocoa  smuggler  uses  the  same  means  as the  cocoa
board,  only  he  has to  grease  sevaral  palms.
3.  Home  goods  include  all  goods  and  economic  activity  that  do not  contribute  to
the  supply  of tradables. This  would  include  commerce,  e.g.,  the
distribution  and  marketing  of imported  consumer  goods,  and  highly  protected
manufacturing  that  thrives  on cheap  imports  via licenses  at the  official
rate.  See  also  Krueger  (1974).
4.  Intuitively,  the  private  sector  maximizes  the  value  of  home  goods  minus
smuggling  costs.
5.  This  is the  same  as the  steady-state  solution  in  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987),
eqs. (18)-(20),  with  a-0o.
6.  For  a proof,  see  Pinto  t1986),  Appendix  I.  There  are  two  predetermined
variables,  m and  F, and  one  jump  variable,  #.
7.  This  explains  why the  minimum  point  of #*(#)  in  Fig.  1 is less  than  unity.
It  enables  a consistent  comparison  of inflation  between  the  dual  and  unified
regimes.
8.  Lizondo  (1987)  studies  unification  in  a similar  set-up,  but  with two  major
differences:  absence  of rationing,  and  an exogenously  given  growth  rate  for
domestic  money. Therefore,  upon  unification,  there  is  a unique  equilibrium
and  the  issue  of post-unification  inflation  does  not  arise. Lizondo  focuses
instead  on the  exchange  rate  and  balance  of payments  following  unification.- 25 -
9.  Only in  the  unrealistic  case  of a zero  fiscal  deficit  will a  one-shot
devaluation  permanently  lower  the  premium. Nominal  domestic  money,  H, is
fixed  so that  m permanently  declines  (e-0  since  there  is  no inflation  tax).
10.  This  will raise  the  unit  inflation  tax;  but  total  revenue  from  inflation
will  continue  to  be (g-t)  in the  new  steady  state.
11.  In  Ghana  (Pinto  (1986)),  e  was fixed  at  2.75  cedis  per  dollar  between  1978
and  October,  1983. With foreign  exchange  rationing  and  the  monetization  of
deficits,  b continued  to  depreciate,  reaching  about  90  cedis  per  dollar  by
October,  1983,  resulting  probably  in the  highest  recorded  premium  in
historyt
12.  For  other  examples,  see  Quirk  et  al. (1987). In Latin  America,  Bolivia  is  a
classic  recent  case.  (see  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987)).
13.  Nigeria's  experience  is instructive  for  another  reason,  demonstrating
conclusively  that  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  not  a  weighted  average  of
the  official  and  black  market  rates. Immeeiately  before  its  float  in
September,  1986,  the  official  rate  was 1.50  and  the  black  market  rate
between  4  and  5 naira/dollar.  Since  official  oil  exDorts  accounted  for  more
than  952  of total  exports;  it  was  believed  that  upon  floating,  a rate  close
to  1.5  naira/dollar  would  emerge. However,  a rate  very  close  to 5
naira/dollar  emerged. This  development  was consistent  with rationing  and
the  implicit  re-sale  of officially  allocated  dollars  in  the  dual  regime.
14.  With  the  exception  of the  Gambia,  the  floats  in  Africa  have  been "current
account'  based,  with capital  controls  having  been retained. In such  cases,
black  market  premia  have  declined  from  their  substantial  initial  levels  of
several  hindered  percent  to 10-15  percent,  an example  being  provided  by
Zaire. This  suggests  seepage  between  current  and  capital  account
transactions.
15.  Johnson  et al. (1985)  suggest  that,  for  countries  with  a history  of  high
inflation,  people  are  accustomed  to living  with depreciation  that  "will  at- 26 -
least  offset  inflation,  and  there  is little  problem  in  accelerating  the  rate
slightly  to  produce  a  real  depreciation".  The  arguments  advanced  here
suggest  that  such  a policy  could  be  costly.
16.  For  an imaginative  treatment  of credibility  issues,  see  Calvo  (1986)  and
van  Wijnbergen  (1985).
17.  Suppose  0-3  to start  with,  implying  a tax  rate  of 67  percent,  and  that  the
export  is  bought  by a commodity  board. Upon  unification,  the  government
might  find  it  difficult  to justify  an explicit  tax  of 67  percent. It  may,
however,  decide  upon  a lower  tax  of say,  15  percent. This  has  the  advantage
of eliminating  the  misallocation  costs  associated  with cheap  imports  in  the
erstwhile  dual  regime,  since  importers  must  now  pay  the  unified  rate.- 27 -
Appendix
Linearizing  (19)-(20)  around  the  saddle-point  stable,  low-inflation
equilibrium  (91 m*,  F*)  givest
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or  x  - D.y,  where  x'  - (i,  F),  etc.,  and  the  partial  derivatives  in  D are
evaluated  at (tl,  m*,F*). Recall  that  m is  now  defined  as  M/u  and  is therefore
equivalent  to  m/t - M/b in  the  dual  regime.
Shape  of di  - 0  Curve  MQH)  in  Fig.  4
When  di  - 0,  it follows  from  (20)  that (g-t)  - mu.  From  portfolio
ba,ance,  we know  that  m/(m  +  F)  - \(u),  X'  c  0.  Hence,  we can  write:
(22)  (R ; t)  .m  + P
(23)  Ai(u)  - _  m
m + F
which  are  parametric  in  u.  Let  t*  denote  the  unit  inflation  tax  maximizing  rate
(level  of u  which  maximizes  X(fi).Q).  From (22),  when  Q - W*,
(m  +  F) is  at its  minimum  value. When  Q >  r*,  X(U).C  is lower  and (m  +  F) is
higher. Further,  m/(m  +  F) falls  (see  (23)),  so  that  m/F  declines. Hence,
this  part  of the  di  - 0 is  nagatively  sloped  and  becomes  asymptotic  to the
horizontal  axis  in Fig.  4  as u  #A.
When  u <  t*,  (m  +  F) grows,  but  so does  m/(m  +  F),  so that  m/F
increases.  Consequently,  the  mi  - 0  curve  cuts  the  F  - 0 curve  from  below  and
asymptotically  aproaches  the  line  with slope io/(l  - X.)  as Au  0, 10  X(o) 6
(0, 1).- 28  -
Slope  of Saddle  Path  in  Fig.  4
From  the  phase  plane  in  Fig.  4,  we know  that  the  saddle  path is
positively  sloped. Let  v* denote  the  slope  of the  saddle  path,  VV.  Then  v* is
the  positive  root  of the  quadratic  (see  (21)):
(24) Pv)  -av2  + (a -1  - F*  )v  +  (  m*)2  O.
We want to  know  if  1A*  2 )4(l-X),  where  x  is  evaluated  at rl  Directly  from
from (24),  P(X0(1  - X))  X  aX  -
Consequently,
>  a  a  >  (1-)  _  V*  >  X
(25)  P  0  .
<0  <- 29 -
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